waterdelayed

August 8, 2001

Why was water delayed for the Thirtymile crew?

Reports and checklists required for fires

Publisher's Comment ~ by Lee Hicks

The circumstances of the Thirtymile fire tragedy has resulted in one of the most serious policy challenges ever faced by the Forest Service in the Northwest. And it’s also a high-profile issue nationally.

Now that the question of whether endangered species issues could have delayed water for firefighters has emerged, there is a new political side to the tragedy.

Anyone who has talked to Forest Service managers and spokesmen since the fire has likely picked up a sense of frustration over the continuing media barrage.

The Forest Service has attempted to re-direct the emphasis to what will be concluded in the official report of a 17-person investigative team expected this month.

Mostly in response to the news that endangered species may have played a part, the Forest Service last week issued a statement that "speculation" of that and other causes would be a "grave disservice" to victims’ families and survivors until the full report is issued.

The statement could also be aimed at those who have publicly questioned whether suppressing fires in remote areas, such as the upper Chewuch River canyon where the fire began and in adjacent wilderness areas, should be a firefighting priority.

No matter what the perspective of special interests, there is merit in giving investigators a full hearing on what will hopefully be a comprehensive, factual and objective report on what happened in every step of the Thirtymile incident—from the time it was first reported to the time of the fatalities.

That does not mean, however, that media and others should not responsibly raise questions. In doing so, they may guide investigators to probe more deeply and see more clearly what might have happened, and give them a better fix on what is fiction and fact.

And the result of this report may well lead to a new direction for the Forest Service of policies and strategies to manage wildfires.

Why was water delayed for the Thirtymile crew?

Endangered species and other factors investigated

By Lee Hicks

Among a set of factors that may have contributed to the deaths of four firefighters in the Thirtymile fire is the possibility that water from the Chewuch River was delayed as the result of endangered fish policies.

This may have been one of many variables that contributed to the tragic blaze, according to new information from sworn affidavits, dispatch logs, media reports and interviews with Forest Service managers.

Forest Service officials have thus far downplayed the importance of fish issues in delaying a helicopter from dropping water onto the fire.

But the fact that dispatchers were unsure if river water could be withdrawn may in itself pose questions regarding what guidelines and training have been given to personnel, at the district or other levels, to deal with the fish issues.

The various factors give the 17-person national investigative team a considerable challenge, in a volatile political and media atmosphere, to find the causes and suggest measures to prevent future disasters.

With new details, it appears that the Forest Service crew on the blaze expected a helicopter to drop water as early as 10 a. m. July 10. The chopper was requested at 5:30 a. m. by a hot shot crew that had worked the blaze since soon after midnight, according to dispatch logs.

By the time the helicopter was permitted to dip water from the river, the fire was showing signs of a sleeping giant in timber already sucked dry by this year’s drought as temperatures neared 100 with low humidity.

In less than two hours after the helicopter eventually entered the fire fray, a crew of 21 firefighters was split by tongues of flames across the only road into the upper Chewuch basin. A "blowup" sent smoke more than 20,000 feet as the fire created its own erratic and deadly weather pattern.

Much information must await the report of the investigators.

But it now appears, from various official sources and interviews with survivors, that the blaze became troublesome, possibly spreading beyond a mop-up operation, some time in the early afternoon of July 10.

Besides any delays resulting from fish policies, the team probing the tragedy must also focus on a number of other factors. These could include the early and progressive assessment of the fire’s potential and the quality of communications between ground crews and fire managers. The investigators will have to make a judgment of whether at some point a more aggressive approach with greater resources, of personnel and equipment, could have blunted the blaze that eventually scorched nearly 9,500 acres into the Pasayten Wilderness.

Making the situation all the more daunting for fire managers was the need to balance resources between the highly active South Libby Creek fire that had threatened homes and remained only partially contained.

The Thirtymile fire, which officials say started from an unattended campfire the previous weekend, erupted in late afternoon. Some time near 5:30 p.m., the fire swept over 14 firefighters and two campers who had taken shelter in heat-shielding tents as flames churned up the narrow canyon.

The firestorm had leaped the road, then roared through their "safe zone" in a clearing on the road and upslope boulders. Left in its wake were the four who perished from inhaling superheated air, another seriously burned and several others requiring medical treatment.

AFFIDAVITS PINPOINT DELAYS

Among new information are sworn affidavits by persons who were listening to radio dispatches from the Forest Service’s Okanogan dispatch center. The News has compared that information with dispatch logs for the first 44 hours of the fire that were posted on the Thirtymile fire website after the fatalities, information from the Forest Service spokesmen and recently published newspaper interviews of fire crew survivors.

The affidavits were given by two people familiar with Forest Service firefighting procedures. One of them was identified as a former agency employee. Both affidavits were provided to the News in confidence.

The affidavits essentially make the same statement regarding a radio request to use water from the Chewuch River: They say that some time from 1:30 to 2:00 p. m., a request came from an airborne unit for permission to take water in buckets from the Chewuch River to drop on the fire.

As stated in one affidavit: "I heard the Okanogan dispatch deny permission to take water from the Chewuch River because it is a ‘protected stream’ for salmon." (quotes added by the person making the statement) "I am aware of such a written policy that the Forest Service follows in fire management," the statement continues.

The person also states: "I heard the Forest Service dispatchers respond that they did not yet have clearance to use Chewuch River water for firefighting and they had to deny permission for the heli-attack crews..."

Both persons say in their affidavits that they understood dispatchers were trying to obtain authorization to withdraw water from the Chewuch to comply with endangered fish policy.

One of the affidavits concludes:

"It is my intent that this statement not be used to criticize the actions of any particular Forest Service employee, but to review a...policy that stands in the way of safe and effective firefighting."

It is not known if the availability of water in relation to fish protection is a focus of the official Forest Service investigation. But a comparison of Forest Service wildfire suppression policy with fish policy documents that grew out of the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan would indicate they have the potential to create uncertainty in critical firefighting situations.

Simply put: Forest Service wildland fire management policy calls for managers to, "provide first for firefighter and public safety," according to an "action item" in a 2001 review of the 1995 policy.

"Once people are committed to an incident, those resources become the highest value to be protected and receive the highest management considerations," it reads.

But the 1995 Forest Service "record of decision" for inland and anadramous fish impacts, which grew out of the 1994 forest plan, mandate "primary" consideration to fish and fish habitat in fire suppression methods.

The "INFISH" and "PACFISH" rules establish procedures for setting up camps and battling fires near streams or riparian areas. They also require a review by "resource advisors" of measures such as withdrawing water from streams to fight fires, or dropping chemical retardant.

Although the fire retardant, or "slurry," is 85 percent water, it also contains 10 percent fertilizer (ammonia phosphate and sulfate ions), and five percent minor ingredients, such as iron oxide for color, clay or bentonite, according to the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise.

Exemptions to the fish protection rules "may be granted following a review and recommendation by a ‘resource advisor.'"

In a critical firefighting situation, the rules would seem to create a layer of decision-making that potentially could put firefighters at risk.

In what could be an unfortunate coincidence, and perhaps result in even more speculation, audio tapes of the fire dispatch are not available, according to a Forest Service manager. More complete dispatch logs, but not verbatim voice transcripts, have been sealed by investigators.

The dispatch office’s audio tape system had not been connected after a relocation of the Okanogan offices in late June, according to Jan Flatten, environmental coordinator for the Okanogan National Forest.

HELICOPTER REQUESTED IN EARLY MORNING

From Flatten’s responses to questions from the News, and information from other sources, it appears that critical questions evolve around the role of the helicopter in fighting the Thirtymile fire.

The following chronology addresses a sequence of events, including when a helicopter was requested, and expected, to help battle the fire, and the possible delays in its arrival at the blaze:

—An Entiat hot shot crew that fought the fire from just after midnight had requested a helicopter to drop water at 5:30 a.m.

—The helicopter and crew expected to work the fire left Wenatchee’s Pangborn Field at 10 a.m., arriving about 10:30 at the North Cascades Smokejumper Base. Forest Service officials said the helicopter crew had gone off duty at 9 p.m. the previous evening and flight rules required 10 hours of "undisturbed rest." At 9 a.m. July 10, the crew began to "preflight" the chopper to head for the Methow Valley.

—The crew boss trainee, in his sixth year of firefighting, apparently thought the helicopter would be available at 10 a.m. after he arrived with a crew of 20 others about 9 a.m. to replace the hot shot crews. At that time the several small fires and a larger one of less than an acre were considered in the "mop-up" state.

—Helicopter crews, in communication with dispatchers, awaited a request from the on-site incident commander, Flatten said Tuesday (July 31). She later explained in an e-mail communication that, "once the helicopter was at the NCSB (smokejumper base) the IC needed to order the helicopter to ensure the crew is ready for it."

—At 12:08 p. m., a crew boss requested the helicopter. By noon the crew had also asked that the hot shot crew return to the fire, possibly indicating it was becoming more troublesome.

—The call for a helicopter set in motion a request by dispatchers to obtain permission from fire managers because of Forest Service polices for protecting endangered or threatened fish. The Chewuch River is habitat for spring chinook salmon, steelhead trout and bull trout—all listed under the federal Endangered Species Act. There was the possibility a helicopter bucket dipping into the river could trap fish.

—Immediately after the request, dispatchers attempted to reach Methow district forest managers to get permission for the helicopter to withdraw from the Chewuch.

—At 2 p.m., dispatchers called Elton Thomas, the fire supervisor for the Okanagon and Wenatchee forests. Thomas was meeting at the Liberty Bell High School fire management center with Pete Soderquist, district fire manager, Methow district ranger John Newcom and John Rohrer, the district biologist, to discuss the Libby South fire.

According to Flatten, "They immediately conferred and said ‘go ahead and do it (send the helicopter).’ When (the dispatchers) reached the people they needed to talk to there was no delay at all."

At 2:17 p.m., logs show the helicopter, identified as "13 November," left the smokejumper base and at 2:38 took off with a bucket from the Eightmile Ranch.

Continuing to overshadow the investigation will be the question of whether the delay in sending a helicopter, first requested by the expert hot shot crew about dawn, and the eventual permission to withdraw water more than eight hours later, was the result of endangered fish issues, a breakdown in communications, or an underestimation of the fire’s potential.

Was it a combination of those or other possible reasons? Or was the sudden "blowup" an unpredictable catastrophe that can develop in the dangerous and uncertain calculus of fighting fires?

In Flatten’s words: "Everybody has a little piece of the picture. It’s the business of the investigation team to figure out what happened, why it happened and what we can do different the next time."

Although a national news organization has apparently obtained more detailed dispatch logs, Flatten said she would have to forward requests for that and other information to the Forest Service’s Washington office.

There are a number of requests, including one from the News, that have been filed under the Freedom of Information Act.

CREW EXPECTED CHOPPER EARLY

In recent broadcast and published reports, crew boss trainee Pete Kampen of Leavenworth said he expected the helicopter to be available for his Forest Service regulars not long after they relieved the hot shot crew.

The News has been unable to reach Kampen by phone. Forest Service spokesmen say Kampen has decided not to continue with media interviews.

In an interview with KPQ last week, Kampen said "A bucket drop at 10 o’clock would have done us a lot of good. We would have maybe been able to corral it. We’ll never know. But it would have made a difference. It may have set the time-frame back a little bit. We may have been able to catch it. But for one reason or another it wasn’t available to us."

Kampen also told the radio station: "I walked out to the road, got ahold of dispatch, ordered up two more crews after the (hot) shot crew to be mobilized, asked for the ETA of the helicopter again...then unknown ETA of the helicopter. They (dispatchers) said they’d launched air attack with Gabe Jasso (an experienced spotter) to locate dip sites for the helicopter."

Dispatchers told him, Kampen said, that, "due to the proximity to the creek (Chewuch River) they would not be able to drop retardant (with larger air tankers). They’d only be able to drop water."

The information from dispatchers regarding retardant drops appears to coincide with Forest Service guidelines prohibiting drops of the "slurry" within 300 feet of streams. At that point, Kampen told KPQ, temperatures reaching to the mid-90s with 14 percent humidity "in a fairly high (tree) canopy in a narrow canyon" would have made a water drop from a single-engine air tanker "ineffective" because of evaporation.

But, Kampen said, "a bucket drop with the helicopter, a concentrated drop right on top of the heavy fuels would be a lot more effective. They can navigate that bucket down pretty low into the canopy."

When Kampen’s crew arrived, there was a blaze of about a quarter acre along with a half dozen or so spot fires, some only a few feet across. Kampen was quoted in the Wenatchee World as saying he believed, "our best tactic was to get water on it right away."

After assessing the fire situation, Kampen and his squad bosses began working on the fire line about 10:22 a.m., he told interviewers. The hot shot crew bedded down at a campground two miles from the road at 11:52 a.m., the dispatch log reads.

The Seattle Times reported in its Sunday edition that "around noon," Kampen radioed from the road, the only place he could get a clear signal, to ask about the helicopter and request that the hot shots return.

At 12:52 p.m. the hot shots returned, according to the dispatch log.

At 2:17 p.m., the log shows the helicopter en route and at 2:31 p.m., an "engine responding."

Three air tankers responded to the fire at 2:54 p.m.; crews retreated to the road for safety at 3:58 p.m.; the tankers were diverted to the Libby South fire at 4:18 p.m.

At 5:24 p.m. the log entry reads "Forest Service regulars sheltered."

At 5:25 p.m. are the ominous log entries: "accident investigation team ordered; national incident management team mobilized; wildland fire situation analysis (WFSA) completed."

Ground crews, however, did not return to the fire until July 12 after a national interagency type 1 team took over management of the incident. How large and aggressive the fire was before the blowup is another question that may have to be resolved by the investigators’ report.

As for endangered fish policies, Hart said: "It’s a consideration in any suppression that (takes place) over a period of time. For an initial attack, they’re supposed to be able to go ahead and use what they can use at the time...This, of course, wasn’t an initial attack."

But the debate has already made it to the House Resources Subcommittee. Rep. Scott McInnis, R-Colo., the subcommittee chairman, said Tuesday (July 31) he wants to know if the endangered species policy played a role in the fatalities. Washington 1st District Democrat Rep. Jay Inslee, the ranking minority member, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying he would resist attempts to use the firefighter deaths as a rationale for attacking the 1972 Endangered Species Act.

Reports and checklists required for fires

by Lee Hicks

The most high-profile issue emerging thus far in the Thirtymile fire is the possible role of endangered fish policies in delaying water.

It’s the issue that created attention-grabbing headlines after being reported nationally by Fox News, followed by the other networks, conservative national radio personality Rush Limbaugh, and national and regional print media.

But as the media frenzy abates, the official inquiry by a Forest Service team must also unravel the complete series of decisions and communications from the time a highly trained hot shot crew arrived at the small fire just after midnight.

Some of that information might be available in a Wildland Fire Situation Analysis (WFSA) report. It is not clear when fire managers or crews began this required report, but a dispatch log entry for the first 44 hours of the fire reads that the WFSA was "completed" at 5:25 p.m. July 10. But that is also the time that notes, "accident investigation team ordered."

By then, four crew members, including three young rookies, were dying inside their emergency shelters.

The WFSA, according to a National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) website, is "a decision-making process that evaluates alternative suppression strategies against selected environmental, social, political and economic criteria." It also provides a record of decisions.

Another document may also be important. A Wildland Fire Implementation Plan (WFIP), according to the NIFC, is a, "progressively developed assessment and operational management plan that documents the analysis and selection of strategies and describes the appropriate management response for a wildland fire being managed for resource benefits."

There is also an extensive written checklist, a "Northwest Mobilization Guide," for fire incident management teams to complete. Among the items it addresses are weather, fuel types, topography, natural barriers, environmental constraints, helicopter and other air support.

Among "values at risk" the checklist includes, in this order: "life, water, timber, grazing, wildlife, livestock, soil, improvements, history, air, land ownership, recreation, equipment." The mobilization guide also gives the name of a "resource advisor" to provide guidance on environmental issues, such as endangered species.

Besides the air support—and what role endangered fish may have played in its availability—other important issues are the changing behavior of the fire, and communications among ground crews and with dispatchers, air crews and fire management officials. And investigators must also continue to address the concerns over where and how the trapped firefighters deployed their heat-shielding shelters against a wall of flames. An initial 72-hour report has discounted crew inexperience or weather as contributing factors. It also said the 14 picked appropriate sites to deploy shelters, but additional information could change those conclusions.

The fire was apparently showing signs of more than a mop-up operation, as officials have said, when the type 2 crew arrived. There are clues in dispatch logs, and statements attributed to crew boss Pete Kampen, that the fire may have changed to more troublesome proportions by late morning.

Firefighting strategies, and resources, differ considerably from mop up and "initial attack" on wildfires.

The NIFC defines initial attack as action taken by "the first resources to arrive at a wildfire to protect lives and property and prevent further extension of the fire."

A mop-up is described as actions to "make a fire safe or reduce residual smoke" after it has been "controlled by extinguishing or removing burning material along or near the control line, felling snags, or moving logs so they won’t roll downhill."

A critical variable, then, may be the points at which the Thirtymile fire was considered a mop-up with attention to protecting fish and other resources, or an initial attack strategy in which lives were at risk.

Campfires banned in national forest

By John Hanron

It was just after midnight last Thursday (Aug. 2) when a group of 100 campers from Oregon were startled from their sleeping bags in their camp on the Chewuch River by a flurry of small explosions.

"At first I thought it was poachers," said George Jeffcott, one of 103 members of the Obsidians from Eugene, Ore., who are camping at Sheep Camp, just past Eightmile Ranch on the West Chewuch "but then it became clear it wasn’t a rifle."

Jeffcott said the best he could figure, some mischief-makers cruised through the campground and detonated six or seven small explosives. A few minutes later, the scene was repeated across the river.

"I keep going through in my mind what could have happened if one spark took off," said Jeffcott, a former first-response firefighter. "I’ve never seen a forest so dry. There were a couple of babies and an old firefighter who didn’t get much sleep that night.

"This place is absolutely tinder dry. I’m surprised they don’t close it down."

Officials at the Okanogan and Wenatchee National Forests agree, to a point.

Beginning last Friday (Aug. 3) campfires are prohibited in the entire Okanogan National Forest except in designated Wilderness areas.

"We want folks to know that the forest is still open to recreation use," said supervisor Sonny O’Neal. "However, the public needs to understand the seriousness of the current fire danger and cooperate with these expanded campfire restrictions."

Campfires are being allowed in Wilderness areas because most of those lands are at higher elevations. An exception is land in the Lake Chelan Sawtooth Wilderness within two miles of Lake Chelan, where conditions are drier.

A statement from O’Neal said additional enforcement rangers will be working in the woods to enforce the restrictions and cite violators, and, he added, the added eyes of responsible forest visitors will be depended upon to alert the Forest Service of illegal fires or suspicious smoke. Visitors are encouraged to drown any smoldering campfires they may come across.

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